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The Medium is the Mistake: The Law of
Software for the First Amendment
R. Polk Wagner*
is computer software-code written by humans that instructs a computer to
pe1jorm certain tasks- protected by the Firs t Amendment ? The answer to this
question will significantly impact the course offutu re technological regulation
and will affect the scope offree expression rights in new media. in this note, R.
Polk Wagn er sets forth aframeworkfor analys is of this issue, noting at the outset that the truly important question in this context is the threshold question·
Wha t is "speech or . .. the press " ? Wagner first describes two ways that the
Supreme Court has addressed the threshold question One is ontological-focusing on the expressive content of the speaker's conduct or the medium chosen The second approach is teleological- determining whether the regulation
at issue implicates free expression Wagne r argues that the teleological
mode-especially as applied to computer software and other new media- is the
more likely to be consistently speech-protective, and that the co urts that have
addressed computer software have mistakenly opted for the ontological, medium-focused analysis. Use of a teleological approach implies that there
should be no "law of software, " a conclusion that Wagn er argues holds the
most promise for extending robust First Amendment protections into new mediwns of communication.
Each method of communicating ideas is "a law unto itself' and that law must
reflect the "differing natures , values, abuses and dangers" of each method.

-

Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 1

There's truth in the old saw that familiarity breeds contempt: nobody goes to
Speakers Comer to listen.

-John Hart Ely 2

* J.D., Stanford Law School, 1998; B.S. E., University of Michigan, 1993. The author wishes
to extend thanks to Professors John Hart Ely, Tom Grey, Margaret Jane Radin, and Kathleen Sullivan, to the participants in the Legal Studies Colloquium at Stanford Law School for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Paul Epstein and Tyler Newby of the Stanford Law Review for their
editing. Their assistance greatly strengthened thi s paper; its remaining weaknesses are mine alone.
I. 453 U.S. 490,50 1 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J. ,
concurring)).
2. John Hart Ely , Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 H ARV. L. REV. 1482, 1489 (1975).
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It IS Saturday, somewhere in Silicon Valley. Debra , a young computer
programmer, is putting the finishing touches on a revolutionary new software
product, Lucifer. 3 Written in the programming language known as JavaTM,
Debra intends to make Lucifer available to computer users on a variety of
popular platforn1s. An experienced programmer, she und erstands tha t programmin g is a curious mixture of science and art, the pragmatic and the elegant. There is much original thought built into Debra 's program, such as her
ideas about proper logical organi zation , or the best language in which to program. But her creativity is highl y constrained by the very fact that she is
writing a set of instructions to dri ve a machine . In fact, in order to make the
program useful, she must convert the Java code she understands into a language that the machine 's processor understands- a process known as compilati on . Once compilation is complete, the software can be used to operate a
computer in the way in which she intended.

Debra 's intent in writing Lucifer is complex. Lucifer is designed to
break into--"hack"-corporate and government computer systems. Debra
knows that hac king is against the law, 4 but she persists nonetheless for several reasons. First, she believes that the laws against hacking are mi sguided,
servi ng only to lull corporations and governments into a false sense of security about the invulnerability of their networks . Additionally, she hopes to
share her ideas about programming by lettin g other programmers see and use
her work. 5 Finally, Debra hopes to make money by marketing Lucifer software to corporations and governments as a tool for analyzing the strength of
their security systems. 6
Can Debra be prosecuted under a law making it illegal to develop hacking software? Or does Lucifer raise First Amendment questions, limiting the
power of government to stop Debra's programming and distribution activities? Hacking is conduct, but programming is at least partially expression.
And Debra's creation of Lucifer clearly has expressive motivations, just as

3. Both Lucifer and Debra are fictional , tho ugh th eir story is inspired by the program called
"S atan" written by software programmers Wietse Venem a and Dan Farmer. See John Marko ff,
Dismissal of Security Expert Adds Fuel to In ternet Debate, N.Y. TI MES, Mar. 22, 1995, at D4 (describing "Satan" and its writers' plans for its releas e) .
4. See generally Xan Raskin & Jea nni e Schaldach-Paiva, Computer Crimes, 33 A M. CPJM. L.
REV. 541 (1996) (s urveying different types of computer crime). Every state except Vermont has
enacted some form of computer-crime statut e. See id. at 563 & n. 153 .
5. Cf Whitney v. Cal ifornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (192 7) (Brandeis, J., co ncurring) ("[F]reedom
to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery an d spread of
political truth. ").
6. Cf United States v. National Treasury Employees Uni on, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1 995) (holding that a "prohibition on compensation unquestion ably imposes a sign ificant burden on expressive
activity").
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Gregory Lee Johnson made his point by buming a flag in Dallas.7 But does
the programming of Lucifer itself-\vriting the computer software or codefa ll within "speech" or the "press" as did Johnson 's activity? 8 First Amendment doctrine "has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles
of the First Amendment to unique forum s of express ion." 9
The First Amendment generally forbids laws "abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." 10 While the courts and commentators have spared
littl e ink m providing content to the limits of govemment activity with respect to speech and the press, they have paid considerably les s attention to a
logicall y anterior question : What is it, exactly, that "bring[s] the First
A m endment into play?" 11
When the forum of communication involved is the spoken or \Vfitten
word, courts and commentators do not linger long on this question. 12 Called
"relatrvel y minor First Amendment doctrine ," 13 the threshold question may
seem but a smalli sh bump on the road to substanti ve First Amendment analysis-a procedural footnote to the grand tenets of "time, place, and manner"
or "balancing tests." 14 Further, even when the threshold question is considered, it is often read as an epithet announcing a result rather than as the product of careful analysis. 15
However, the threshold question-determining what is speech or th e
A complete First Amendment analysis re-

press-is critically important.

7. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 ( 1989) (strikin g down conviction under a state
flag desecration law).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... ").
9. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981 ).
10. U.S . CONST. amend. I.
II. Johnson , 491 U.S. at 404.
12. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (applying First
Amendment standards to an "editorial advertisement" published in a newspaper). See generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-94 (1988) (discussi ng two "tracks"
of First Amendment analysis). But see Hurley v. Irish-Ameri ca n Gay, Lesbian and Bi sex ual Group,
5 15 U.S. 55 7, 568-70 ( 1995) (finding that a parade was a form of protected expression); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) ("(N]ude dancing ... is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment."); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406, 409-10
( 1974) (per curiam) (stating that affixing a peace symbol to a flag was a form of communication).
13 . Robert Post, Recuperaling Firs/ Amendmenl Doclrine, 47 STAN. L. RE V. 1249, 1252
( 1995).
14. See. e.g. , id. at 1260-70 (discussing the tim e, place, and manner test).
15 . See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) (assuming First Amendment
protection for draft card burning in holding that the government's interest in restricting it was justifi ed under the Constitution). Professor Tribe notes that "the di stinction between speech and conduct must be see n at best as announcing a conclusion of the Court, rather than as summarizing in
any way the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusio n." TRJBE, s upra note 12, at

827.
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quires three generalized steps. First is the threshold questiOn: Is freedom of
speech and the press implicated? If so, the analys is mo ves to the second
step: What is the le vel of scrutiny to be applied to the government action at
issue? Once the court answers this question, the third step controls: Does
the justification for the regulation meet the scrutiny imposed? In effect, any
one of these steps may be dispositive. Laws that do not implicate the First
Amendment do not receive First Amendment review. 16 A "strict scrutiny"
standard, in most cases, will be the death knell for the regulation at issue . 17
And even if it does not fully resolve the issue, the threshold question affects
governmental activities by determining whether content-neutral justifications
must be made for the regulation . 18
The threshold issue typically attracts attention when new modes of
communication are used- and regulated. Union picketers are charged under
a state antipicketing law. 19 A young man bums his draft card, 20 defaces the
American flag, 21 or bums it. 22 The development and expansion of technology in particular raises the threshold question. Computer programmers attempt to export encryption software code; 23 our Debra and her Lucifer software raise similar questions about what qualifies as speech.
This note investigates the operation of the First Amendment threshold
test in an effort to determine the "law of software." Part I identifies two
separate methods of threshold analysis employed by the Supreme Court:
16. See. e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J. , concurring) (explaining the limitations of
First Amendment applicability); Arcara v. Cloud Books , Inc., 478 US. 697 , 707 (1986) (holding
that a statute permitting the closure of a bookstore where solicitation of prost itution took place did
not implicate the First A mendment).
17. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,395-96 (1992) (holding that a "hate crime" ordinance prohibiting the display of a symbol calculated to arouse anger on the basis of race was not
narrowly tailored-and therefore constitutionally invalid- because it was content-specific); Spence,
418 U.S. at 411-15 (1974) (per curiam) (finding that affixing a peace symbol to a flag did not significantly impair the state's interest in preserving the flag's physical integrity).
18. Compare Arcaro, 478 U.S. at 706-07 (declining to apply First Amendment principles to
"a public health regulation of general application"), with Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (allowing the government to prevent camping in a park for contentneutral reasons). One s uspects that the resolution of the threshold question will detem1ine, at the
very least, whether the case is resolved in pretrial motions or at trial. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER
& KATHLEEN M. SU LLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LA W 1210 (13th ed. 1997) (discussing the difference in scrutiny between content-neutral and content-based regulations).
19. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (declaring that peaceful picketing is
speech).
20. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
21. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 405.
22. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
23. See, e.g., Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429-30, 1436
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that computer source code is speech protected by the First Amendment) ;
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. I, 3-4 (D.O. C. 1996) (holding that export restrictions on cryptographic source code did not violate the First Amendment).

I
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ontological and teleologica!Y+ The ontological mode-also properly referred to as "mode-specific"- looks to the activities of the speaker as a gUi de
to whether free expression is implicated. If the speaker is "speaking," then
the First Amendment is triggered. 25 The ontological analysis encompasses
more than the speech-conduct distinction, however. The Supreme Court also
uses the medium of communication chosen by the speaker as the basis for the
threshold detem1ination. 26 The teleological mode, on the other hand, makes
no reference to the speaker's activities or choice of medium. Instead, it focuses squarely on whether the governmental interests that support the regulation are related to the suppression of tree expression. 27 If these interests are
not related to free expression, then the analysis is complete; the First
Amendment is not implicated.
Part II analyzes the law of software as applied to this threshold framework. The teleological mode, of course, rejects any categorization of mediums, and thus lends no guidance to (or support for) a law of software. However, application of the ontological approach to the particularities of computer software exposes fundamental weaknesses in the mode of analysis,
leading to a questioning of this approach, at least as applied to new media. A
threshold focus on the mode of communication-the expressive content of
the speaker's activities or the medium in which they are conducted-is unlikely to provide strong protection for First Amendment values in the new

24. n1ese terms were originally employed by Professor Ely in a similar context. See Ely. supra note 2, at 1496.
25. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403-06; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11.
26. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (I 995)
(finding that a public parade is a "form of expression"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
565-67 ( 1991) (holding that nude dancing gets some First Amendment protection); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 ( 1989) ("[M]usic, as a form of expression and communication,
is protected under the First Amendment."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-12 (1943)
(approving First Amendment protection for the sale of religious handbills); cf Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d I 033, I 035 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a guide to mushrooms "is pure
thought and expression" not covered by state products liability laws); City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 25 ( 1989) (finding that a gathering for recreational dancing is not "expressive association").
27. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393-96 (1992) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting incendiary speech toward racial groups was unconstitutional because it selectively prevented the expression of particular ideas); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 50 I U.S. 663, 669-70
(1991) (holding that promissory estoppel was a law of general application that did not single out the
press); Barnes, SO! U.S. at 577-79 (Scalia, J. , concurring) ("[T]he only First Amendment analysis
applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of
whether the purpose of the law is to suppress communication.") (quoting Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see
also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-18 (1990) (striking down the federal Flag Protection Act because the government interest was related to the suppression of free expression); Arcara
v. Cloud Books , Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702-07 (1986) (finding that a statute permitting the closure of
places in which prostitution was solicited was not aimed at limiting expressive activity).
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media context. Thi s note concludes that the teleol og ical approach, though
imperfect , may be better suited to the de veloping tec hnology of new medi a
communi cations. That is, fo r First Amendment threshold purposes, the "law
of software" simply shoul d not exi st.
I. F ROM O NTOLOGY TO TEL EOLO GY: T HE M ODES OF T HRESH OL D
A NA LYSI S

Le st any readers have lingering susp icions about the existence of a First
Amendment threshold question, thi s part will address that issue before moving further. The underlying logic of thi s point is that courts can uphold
regulations alleged to be prohibited by the First Amendment "on the ground
that they need not be evaluated acc ording to First Amendment standards,"
and they can uphold the very same regulations because they "withstand consti tutional scrutiny." 28 Therefore, some sort of boundary criteria must be
established to detennine whether First Amendment standards will be brought
to bear. The Supreme Court has repeatedl y recognized thi s threshold determination, both expressly and implicitly. In Sp ence v. Washington, 29 the
Court noted as an initial matter that "[i]t is therefore necessary to determine
whether [Spence's] activity was sufficientl y imbued with elements of communication to fa ll withi n the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."30 In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence ,31 the Court
noted that the detem1ination (or assumpti on) of whether "expressive conduct" is present "begins the inquiry ." 32 In Arcm·a v. Cloud Books, 33 the
Court dismissed First Amendment concerns, concluding that "the First
Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation of general application." 34
That the threshold question is not always explicitly answered by the
Court35 does not mean that it does not exist. Where a set of facts concededly
implicates speech or the press, there is obviously little need to linger on the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Post, supra note 13, at 1250.
41 8 U.S . 405 ( 1974) (per curi am).
Jd at 409.
468 u.s. 288 ( 1984).
!d. at 293.
478 U.S. 697 ( 1986).
!d. at 707.
In fact, the tlu-es hold qu esti on is rarely- too rarely in the author's view-addressed.
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issue .36 In Texas v. Johnson,37 the Co urt noted that the fact that Jolmson vvas
not convicted for uttering words "somewhat complicates [the] consideration"38 of the First Amendment issues, by requiring that the Court "first determine" whether the case implicated the First Amendment at all. 39 Plainly,
it is only where the threshold que stion matters-where one side or the other
chooses to make it an issue-that the analysi s is undertaken.
Here we deal wi th computer software, a situation where, as we shall see,
the threshold question does matter.~ 0
A.

Ontological Threshold Analysis

When the Court does ask the threshold question, one method by which it
approaches the issue is ontologically. That is , it looks to the purported
spea ker 's activities to determine whether they possess sufficient communicative el ements to bring the First Amendment into play. The most recogni zable version of this mode of analysis is the Court's speech-conduct distinction first hinted at in United States v. 0 'Brien, 41 given content in Spence v.
Washington, and reaffirmed in Texas v. Johnson.
The crux of the speech-conduct distinction is that while "speech"
highly protected, "conduct" is not. 42 The task of courts under this rubric

IS
IS

36. Parad igm atic cases here include those tha t ex pli citly bear on speech or the press, the spoken or written word. See, e.g., Minneapo lis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983) (striking down , on First Amend ment grounds, a tax direc ted at newspapers);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1 964) (addressing libe l laws directed at newsp apers).
37. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
38 ld at 402-03 (1989).
39. ld
40. Of co urse, it is possibl e to argue that since computer so ft ware code can be printed out,
software is clearly "speech" or "press," obvi ating th e need for threshold analysis. For example, the
District Court for the Northern District of Californi a, in Bernstein v. United Stales Department of
State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996), came cl ose to stating this argument. The District Court
noted that, becaus e the plaintiffs "encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rath er
than in English," expressi veness of conduct need not be considered. !d. at 1434-3 5. But rather than
obviating the threshold question, the District Court was choosing a particular form of the ontological mode of threshold analysis. That is, instead of evaluating the speaker 's conduct, the court
evaluated th e speaker's choice of medium. Because software code could be printed out (or "written"), it was thus evaluated to be speech. See id.
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this case, the majority stated th at "we cannot accept the view that
an apparentl y limitl ess variety of conduct can be la beled 'speech ' whenever the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." !d. at 376. But as Professor Ely noted, this statement was a "false lead" to the true holding of the 0 'Brien Court, which mo ved on to focu s on th e
interests of the reg ulation as the thres hold question. See El y, supra note 2, at 1494-96 (citing
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
42. See Johnson, 491 U.S . at 406 ("[T]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting
expressive conduct than it has in restricting th e written or spoken word.").
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"to determine whether [the speaker's] activity was suffic iently imb ued w ith
elements of communication" to tri gger the protections of the F irst Amendment.43 In making this determination, the Court has asked whe ther (1) " [a]n
intent to convey a particulari zed message was present," and (2) "the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by tho se who viewed
it." 44 If both el ements are present, then the Court will apply F irst Amendment analys1s.45
Unfortunately , fundamental fallacies underli e the speech-conduct dichotomy. It simply ca nnot be disputed that "[t]o some extent express ion and
action are al ways mingled; most conduct includes elements of both ."46 In
fact, as Professor Ely has pointed out: " [B]uming a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, l 00% action and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communication,
and no communication that does not result from conduct." 4 7
Moreover, the test is quite difficult to administer in practice; it is not at
all clear where on the spectrum of speech versus conduct a particular ac ti vity
may fall. While I cannot be prevented from publicly speaking or writing
"Wagner fo r Congress ," blasting the same on loudspeakers at three in the
morning may be regul ated.48 Indeed, by the tern1s of Spence, a flag burning
defendant wo uld have as strong a claim to First Amendment protection as
one who defaced public property with written graffiti, if not stronger. 49 This

43. Spence v. Was hin gton, 418 U.S. 405 , 409 ( 1974) (per curiam ).
44. Johnso n, 491 U.S . at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10-11).
45. See, e.g, Spenc e, 418 U.S. at 415 (finding that di splay ing a fla g with a peace symbol conveyed a particular message "likely to be understood, and with in the contours of the First Amendment"); Johnson, 49 1 U. S. at 406 (finding that in burning a fl ag, Johnse n 's exp ression was "both
intenti onal and overwhelm ingly apparent" ). Thi s anal ys is does not always involve height ened
scrutiny.
46. THOMAS I. EM ERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS ION 80 ( 1970). "Moreover,
if the expression invol ves talk , it may be noi sy; if written , it may becom e litter." TRIBE, supra note
12, at 827 (citing Ko vacs v. Cooper, 33 6 U.S. 77 (1949) (uphold ing an ordin ance prohi b iting th e
use of so und trucks on p ublic s treets) and Schneid er v. Irvington , 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (upholding
an ordinance barring the distribution of leafle ts as a means of reducing litter)).
47. Ely, supra not e 2, at 1495. The Co urt appears to have tried to rectify the speec h- conduc t
distinction by noting th at its importance is substantive rather than proced ural. The government
"may not ... proscribe particular conduct because it has express ive elements." Johnson, 491 U.S .
at 406. But the fac t remains that expression and action are an " undifferen tiated w hole . .. and to
o utlaw the act is therefore necessaril y to regul ate both [the ac ti ve and express ive ) elements." Ely,
supra note 2, at 1496 .
48. See, e.g. , Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949 (allowing res trictions on " loud and
raucous" so und trucks).
49. Under Spence, the flag burner wou ld have to show tha t th e "contex t in w hich [the flag was
burned) for purposes of exp ression" was suc h that those who viewed it would be likel y to unders tand the message. Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10. A defacer could obviate th is prong of the anal ysis by,
for exampl e, spray-painting " Impeach Clinton. "

I
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analysis is also clearl y subject to problems of characterizati on, as co nduct
"cann ot be labeled 'speech ' whenever the person engagin g in the conduct
intends th ereby to express an idea. " 50
The Court ap peared to drop the speech-conduct di stinction after Sp ence,
re surrecting it only in Texas v. Johnson fifteen years later .5i More recently,
the Court criticized the first factor (the "particul arized message" requirement) of the Sp ence framework in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group. 52 Justice Souter spoke for a unanimous court w hen he
stated tha t "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condi tion of
constitutional protection, whi ch if confin ed to express ions conveying a ' particularized message, ' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll. " 53
In addition to the speech-conduct dichotomy, which has attTac ted scholarly attent ion , 5 ~ the Court has used another version of the ontological approach to the threshold question. This approach fo cuses upon the medium of
communication chosen by the speaker, which triggers (or does not trigger)
First Amendment protec tions depending on whether the medium is traditional ly an d familiarly considered to be one which implicates th e First Amendment.55 Rather than receiving protection because of their content, these types
of expression are favored because their m edium is favored or, in other words,

50. Un ited States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968).
51. See Jo hnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (acknowledging that conduct "suffici entl y imbued with
elemen ts of communication" may qualify for First Amendment protecti on) (quoring Spence, 41 8
U.S. at 409).
52. 515U.S.557(1 995).
53. !d at 569 (c itations omitted).
54. See, e.g, EM ERSON, supra note 46, at 16-17 (outlining importan t factors for gaining First
Amendment protection); Ely, supra note 2, at 149 1-96 (discuss ing the dichotomy in flag burning
cases) ; Loui s Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV . L.
REv. 63 , 76-82 (1968) (discussing problems with the dichotomy); Melville B. Nimmer, The ivfean ing of Symbolic Sp eech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 29-38 ( 1973) (d iscussing when conduct co nstitutes speech); Laurence R. Vel vel , Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card
Buming Cases, 16 U. KAN L. REv. 149, 149-62 (1968) (discussing the dichotom y in draft card
burning cases) .
55. Professor Tribe notes several "activities that have histori cally been recogn ized as inextricably intertwined wi th speech or petiti on ... all of these ac tiviti es might variously be described,
wi thout special illuminati on, either as 'speech' or as 'conduct,' but all must be recogni zed as acti vities of special first ame ndm ent significance." TRIB E, supra note 12, at 829-3 0. He includes in thi s
list outdoor distribution of leafl ets, doo r-to-door political canvassing, solicitati on of contributions,
mailbox-stuffing, picketing, civil rights demonstrations, boycotts , communicating with the government, and putting up outdoor posters and signs. See id.
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bec ause they "re fl ect an exercise of these basic constitu tional ri ghts m their
most pri stine and classic fom1." 56
The medium-specific version of the ontologi cal threshold analysis requires courts first to evaluate the medium through which the allegedly infringed speech is being transmitted. In Hurley, the Court began its analysis
by noting that "[p ]arades are thus a fom1 of expression, not just mo tion ." 57
In Jvfetromedia . In c. v. Sa n Diego ,53 the Co urt highlighted the " uniqueness of
each med ium of expression" by noting that " [e ]ach method of communicating ideas is a ' law unto itself."' 59 The idea here-at least with respect to the
threshold analysis- is that there is a "list" of traditi onal or famili ar m ediums.
This ra ises several important points.
First, the " list" of medi a given such favorable treatment has changed
over time. 60 Take the case of motion pi ctures. In 1915, the Court, in i\lfutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm ission, 6 1 rejected a challen ge to an exp lic itly
content-based licen sing statute. The statute allowed only film s of a "moral ,
educati ona l or amusing and harmless character" to be approved. 6 =' Notin g
first that films "may be used for evil ," 63 the Court engaged in a b it of negative medium- specific analysis: Movies were "not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded .. . we think, as part of the press of the country or as
organs of publi c opinion." 64 Twenty-seven years later, in Joseph Burstyn,

56. Hu rley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235
( 1963)).
57. !d. at 568.
58. 453 U.S . 490 ( 198 1).
59. !d. at 50 1 & n.S. It should, of co urse, be noted at the outset that th e " freq ue nt refrain" of
medium-specificity is not unique to threshold an alysis . Much of the "categorizi ng" of substantive
First Am endment law is closely related to the medium in question. For examp le, the Court accords
lo wer constitutional protec tion to speec h co nducted over the w irel ess broadcas t medium. See Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-40 I ( 1969) (upholding the fairness doctrin e, w hich
requires that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side should be given fa ir co verage) . But the Co urt ex tends heightened protection to cable broadcasting, telephone, and th e Internet. See Reno v . ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341-44 (1997) (ho lding co ntent-b ase d res tricti ons on the
Internet unconstitutional ); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S . 622, 661-64 ( 1994) (requiring
intermediate scrutin y for cable reg ulation); Sable Comm. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 , 131 ( 1989)
(finding statutory ban on ce rtain telephone messages uncons titution al). The importance of the medium in the ultim ate substantive analysis further supports the proposition that in many cases the
med ium will be critical to the thres hold determination as we ll.
60. Professor Post argues th at a medium should be added to th e list when th e social co nventions surrou ndin g the medi um create constitutionall y meaningful rela tions hips between th e med ium
and ideas. See Post, supra note 13, at 1253 -54. This is as sound a reason as any, though the Court
is probably not that analytical about what is, by nature, a strikingly ad hoc proposition .
61. 236 U.S . 230 (1915).
62. !d. at 241 (quoting 1913 Ohio Laws 399).
63. !d. at 242 .
64. ld at 244.
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Inc. v. Wilson ,65 the Co urt changed its tune and overruled Jvfutual Film .66 In
Burstyn, the Co urt struck down a statute permitting the banning of " sacrilegious" movies on the grounds that " m otion pictures are a significant m edium
for the communication of ideas." 6 7
Second, the medium-specific approach can be as easily u sed to "downgrade" purported expression as to protect it . For example, courts do not consider the First Amendment to be implicated by "products" such as aeronauti cal charts. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 68 the Ninth C ircuit expl a ined
that aeronautical charts were in a special class of materials- a " medium, " so
to speak- that are more like physical products than books. 69
Third, the medium-speci fic approach is as likely to be arbitrarily applied
as the speech-conduct distinction . On the one hand, City ofDallas v. Stanglin 70 te1ls us that "recreational dancin g" is not a protected expressive act ivity.71 On the other, the plurality opinion in Barnes V. Glen nzeatre, lnc 72
stated th at nude barroom dancing is "within the outer perimeters of the F irst
Amendment." 73 Clearly, there is ample room within the medium-specific
framework for judicial value judgmcnts.7 4 However, the essential failing of
the medium-specific approach is that, by its very nature, it will protect only
orth odox mediums of communication. "There's truth in the old saw that familiarity breeds contempt: nobody goes to Speakers' Corner to listen. " 75

65. 343 u.s. 495 (1952).
66. See id at 502.
67 . !d at 497, 50 I.
68 . 938 F.2d I 033 (9th Cir. 1991 ).
69. See id. at I 035-36. Significantly, the co urt included computer so ftware in this product
classification. See id at 1036; see also Brocklesby v. Jeppesen, 76 7 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that aeronautical charts are products in product li ability suits); Saloomey v. Jeppesen, 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that na vigational charts are products); Post, supra note 13, at 1254 & n.20 (expl aining that courts in cases like Brock!esby do not think of the suits
as raising First Amendment questions). It is not difficult to imagine ho w the argument might proceed for such charts. The cartographer would avow an intent to convey a message (perhaps the
message of the safety and of the enjo yme nt of fl yi ng) and wo uld attempt to show how the message
is particul arly developed. He or she would then argu e, rather plausibly, that the consumers of the
charts wo uld be able to discern this message.
70. 490 u.s. 19 (1989).
71. See id. at 23-25.
72. 501 u.s. 560 (1991).
73. !d. at 566. Justice Souter justified thi s disti nction because nude barroom dancing is "a
performance directed to an ac tual or hypothetical audi ence. " !d. at 581 (Souter, J ., concurring).
74. Cf JO HN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI CIAL REVIEW 4448 ( 198 0) (arguing that the judge's own values are often a source of constitutional judgment, but
that such a practice is unacceptable).
75. Ely, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
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This mode of analysis will favor older, more establi shed, and more litigated
fo m1s of communication- at the expense of new m ed ia. 76
B.

Teleological Threshold Analysis

In R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 77 the Court reJ ected any form of ontological thresho ld analysis when it struck down a statute criminalizi ng "b ias-motivated"
fighting words. It noted instead that the di spositive (and sole) necessary
analysis was that "[t]he First Amendment doe s not pennit St. Paul to impose
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects." 78 Thus, the Court explicated a second mode of threshold analysi s,
a teleological one, which is wholl y separate from the activities of the
speaker. 79 Thi s method asks whether the re gulat10n is intended to suppress
free expression. If it is not, the First A mendment is simply not implicated.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Barn es v. Glen Th eatre, Inc. ,
explicitly noted the procedural nature of the teleological inquiry:

76. Ind eed, one must consider fla g burning, if not draft card burning, p:uades , and music, to
be recent additions to th e " lis t" of medi a that implica te the First Amendment. It remains an open
question wh ether th e inevi tabl e enlargement o f th e scop e of th e medium-spec ific threshold will
re nd er th is mode of anal ys is useless.
77. 505U S.377(1 992).
78 . !d. at 391.
79 . In th e tel eological mode of analysis , the thresh old qu es tion is necess aril y the primary
question ask ed in a substantive balancing of the interes ts of the government and speaker. Therefore, co urts using the teleological approach will, in effect, "co mpress" the anal ys is into two interrelated steps rather th an three: The court first determines whether or not the regulation is related to
free exp ression and then determines the leve l of sc rutiny to be applied. See. e.g. , id. at 391-96
(fi nding that an ordinance suppressing fighting words that provoke violence on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender is content-based and facially unconstituti onal).
This line of analysis is related to the doctrine of impern1issibl e motives, where the "substantive
mo ti va tion" tes t is primaril y concerned with viewpoint discrimination. Sec, e.g., Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806-11 ( 1985) (noting the importance of
motivation analysis while upholding an executive order limiting participation in a charity drive);
Perry Education Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators ' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-55 (1983) (finding no
evidence of viewpoint discrimination when scrutinizi ng a sc hool board 's choi ce to grant preferentia l access to the inter-school mail system to the union currently representing teachers); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,536 (1980) ("[W]hen [the] regulation is
based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure
that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove [of] the
speaker's views. "') (citation omitted). See generally TRJ BE, supra note 12, at 8 14-21 (considering
fac ially neutral regulations motivated by content censo rship) ; Paul Brest, Palm er v. Thompson: An
Approach to th e Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95 (arguing
tha t courts should inquire into legislati ve motivations when they are ascertainable and when other
grounds are not available) ; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrarive Motivation in Co nstitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (defending the rel eva ncy of legislati ve and administrative
motiv ations in determining the constitutionality of government actions).
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All ou r holdings (though admittedly not some of our discuss ion) support the
conclusion that "the onl y First Amen dment ana lysis ap plicable to laws th at do
not directl y or indirect ly impede speech is the threshol d inqu1 ry of whether the
purp ose of the law is to suppress communicati on . If not, that is the end of the
matter so far as the First Amen dment guarantees are concerned; if so, the co urt
th en proceeds to determine whether th ere IS substantial justification fo r the proscription ."80

Scali a stated that the Indi ana statute was one of general applicability because
it did not single out nude dan cing, and thus conviction s under the public indec ency law were vali d since the First Amendment was not implicated. 81
·' Indi ana does not regul ate dancing. It regulates pu blic nudi ty ." 82

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.83 is another example of the teleolog ical approach to threshold analysi s. Rej ecting a claim by a newspaper of First
A mendm ent immuni ty from state promi ssory estoppel Jaws, the Court noted
that the "Minnesota doc trine of promi ssory estoppel is a law of general applicabili ty . It does not target or single out the press." 8.J Thus, the First
Am endm ent did not apply.85
Whil e a strict teleological approach might be criti cized for providing too
little protection to speech,86 the evidence to date does not entirely support
this view. At least five opinions have utilized the teleologi cal threshold approach . In two, the thresho ld test tri ggered the protecti on of the First
Amendment and the Court struck down the regulation at issue .87
More general criticisms of a purpose-based threshold test are similar to
those enunciated against the substanti ve moti vati on analys is used in First

80. 501 U.S. 560, 578 (1 99 1) (quoting Com munity fo r Creati ve Non-Violence v. Watt, 703
F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J. , dissenting)).
81. See id. at 573-76. Justice Scalia drew support for this proposi tion fro m the Court' s deci sions relating to the free exercise of religi on. See id. at 579 (citing Employment Di v., Dep't. of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990) (holding that general laws not specificall y targeted at reli gious practices did not require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they
dimini shed some people 's ability to practice their reli gion)).
82. fd at 572-73 (quoting Miller v. Southbend, 904 F.2d I 08 1, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990)).
83. 50 1 U.S. 663 (1 99 1).
84. Id at 670.
85. See id. at 672 (holding that the First Amendment does not co nfer on the press a constitutional right to di sregard promi ses that would otherw ise be enforced under state law).
86. See, e. g., R.A. V v. St. PauL 505 U.S . 377, 426-28 ( 1992) (Stevens, J , concurring) (arguing that courts should consider the content and context of the speech).
87. See id. at 391 -93 (striking down, on Fi rs t Am endment grounds, a statute criminalizing
"bias-moti vated" fi ghting words); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 3 15-1 9 ( 1990) (holding
that the fed eral Fl ag Protection Act viol ated the First Amendment).
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Amendment viewpoint discrimination cases. 88 In Palm er v. Thompson ,89
Justi ce Black outlined the basic objections to motivation analysis:
First, it is ex tre me ly diffi cu lt for a court to ascert ain th e m otiv ation , o r co ll ec tion o f different m otiv ati ons, that li e behind a legi s lative ena ctment ... . It is
diffi c ult o r imp os si b le for any court to determin e th e "sol e" or " dominant" moti vat ion behin d the c hoices of a g roup of legisl ators. Furthermore, th ere is an
ele men t of futility in a judici al attempt to in validate a law because of th e b ad
mot ives o f its s upp orters. If the law is struck down for th1 s re ason , rather th an
because of its fac ial content or effect, it wou ld presumably be valid as so on as
the legis lature or re levant governing body repass ed it for different rcaso ns. 90

While the analysis of whether a particular enactment is intended to affect
the communication of ideas may be more straightforward than di scerning an
impermi ssible motive in an otherwise permissible regulation, it cannot be
questioned that this challenge will be significant. Indeed, as Professor Ely
notes, "[I]t will be next to impossible for a court respons ibl y to conclude that
a decision was affected by an unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to articulate a plausible legitimate explanation for the acti on taken. " 9 1
But this is no reason not to undertake the inquiry-in fact, many regulations
will not have an equally plausible alternative explanation. 92 As such, teleological analyses seem equally likely to yield good results as any alternative.

II. THE MISTAKES OF MEDIUM: THE PRES ENT STAT E OF THE LAW OF
SOFTWARE

As of Fall 199 8, three courts had analyzed the "law of sofhvare."93
These cases involved challenges to the constitutionality of federal export

88. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 751-52 , 1217 (d iscussing the difficulty of
assessing discriminatory motivation and determining legislative or administrative moti vation).
89. 403 U.S. 21 7 ( 197 1).
90. ld. at 224-25 (citation omitted) .
91. ELY , s upra note 74 , at 13 8.
92. For example, the law at issue in R.A. V, which proscribed the us e of fighting words only
when moti vated by racial or religious bias, had few equall y plausible explanat ions. "A n ordinance
not limited to the (d is)favored topics, for exampl e, would have preci sely the same beneficial effect."
R.A . V , 505 U.S. at 396.
The Barn es law, on the other hand, is a much closer case. Whi le the s im ple proscription of
public nudity would appear to have less to do w ith speech and more to do with the social interest in
order and morality, evidence that the state had not applied the statute to nudity as part of pl ays,
ballets, or operas hints at a motive with First Amendment implications. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
However, difficult factual scenarios do not obviate th e discussion. The Barnes case would be
equally difficult from a threshold perspective in either ontological appro ac h.
93. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. United States Dep't of
State, 925 F. Supp . 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Bernstein v. United States Dep' t of State, 922 F. S upp. 1426
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
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controls on encryption software-specifically source code and object code .94
While the fed eral reg ulation s95 do not restrict the export of software in written material , like books, they do restrict software exports in "machine readable" form. 96
The first case to be decided was Karn v. United States D epartment of
Karn challenged the re strictions on the international trade of his
computer diskette containing cryptographic software samples, claiming that
th e regulatory scheme imposed by the Arn1s Export Control Act was an impennissible prior restraint on free speech. 98 In considering the defendant' s
motion for summary judgment, the court made no explicit ruling on the
threshold question, though it assumed for the purposes of the decision that
the medium of source code may indeed trigger the protections of the First
Amendment 99 Nonetheless, the court granted the summary judgment motion, holding that th e government's rationale, not the forn1 of speech or expression, controls the level of scrutiny. 100 The court then applied the 0 'Brien

State. 97

94. Source code is computer code und ers tandable by humans. lt is where the initial creation
of the computer program takes place. In order to be understood ("run") by a computer, source code
must be co nve rted into object code. This conversion is achieved by specialized computer programs
known as compilers. These compilers take source code written in a specified language and co nvert
(o r "compile") it into object code. Typically, compilers are specifically designed for a particular
processor, since most processo rs usc slightly diffe rent patterns (or "instructions") to ac comp lish
th eir tasks. Source code, on the other hand , is more versatil e. As long as a compiler is available for
a particular processor, the so urce code can be used to create a working program for that machine.
Digital object code is the fund amental language, or code, of the computer, and is the building
block for all computer codes. At root, all computer processors operate using a series of Is and Os.
The patterns of Is and Os in object code represent the alphanumeric characters used in the source
code. The sequence and patterns of the Is and Os cause different responses from the computer. In
general, object code cannot be read and understood by humans-it is the exclusive domain of the
computer.
95. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (authorizing the
President to control the import and export of "defense articles"); International Traffic in Arms
Regulations , 22 C. F.R. §§ 120-130 (1998) (creating a procedure by which the State Department
determines whether an item is covered by the Arms Export Control Act).
96. Given that the "wri tten" software could be typed or scanned into computer-usable form,
this distinction raises many questions. Apparently, the government is only interested in slowing
down the international spread of encryption software, and deems that export via printed matter
imposes enough obstacles to suit this purpose. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at I 0 (noting that m ac hine
readable media makes encoding by foreign intelligence sources much easier).
97. 925 F. Supp. I.
98. See id. at 9. The software was also printed in the definitive book on cryptography, BRUCE
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOG~>\PHY 623-73 (2d ed. 1996). The government did not object to the
export of the book. See Karn , 925 F. Supp. at 3.
99. See id. at 9-10.
100. See id. at 10 (explaining that if the regulation were content-specific it would be "presumptively invalid," but if it were content-neutral the government can justify the regulation if other
criteria are met).
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test, and found the government interest to be unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. 101 The court let the restriction stand.
The Kam decision appears to have passed lightly over the threshold
question and JUmped immediately to substantive anal ysi s using the 0 'Brien
test. By mo ving straight to the analysi s of the regulation , the Karn court
found it unnecessary to resolve the status of software code under the First
Amendment. 102 Under R.A. V and O'Brien, the cour1 noted , the government 's rationale for the restriction is determinative. 103 The best re ading of
the case, then, is that the court used a teleological threshold test in place of
the assumed-away ontological test. By focusing squarely upon the intent and
reach of the governmental action, the court thus avoided the fallacies of the
ontological, medium- specific threshold analysi s.10·1
The Bernstein v. United States Dep artment of State 105 decision is not so
successful at avoiding such fallacies. While the basic fact pattern is quite
similar to Karn, 106 the Bernstein court explicitly ruled that source code is
speech for the purposes of the First Amendment, 107 noting that "Bernstein's
encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather than in English."1 08 The court's analysi s is plagued by several fundamental fallacies.
First, the B ernstein court's rush to formalism on the threshold question
effectively disconnects the rationale for the decision from the support of First

10 1. The court held:
The defend ants are not regulatin g the export of the di skette because of the expressive content
of the comments and or source code , but instead are regulating because of the belief that th e
combination of encryption sourc e code on machine readabl e media will make it easier for foreign intelligence sources to encod e their communi cati ons.

!d. at 10.
102. See id. at 10 ("Accordingly, it is unnecess ary for the Court to make any finding regarding the nature of the (purported speech). ").
103. See id. This is markedly similar to the Supreme Court 's approach in O'Brien itself,
wh ere it assumed away the speech-conduct question to focu s on the regulation at issue. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 ( 1968) (stating that even if burning a draft card triggered
the First Amendment, the conduct would not be constitutionally protected if the regulation reflects a
legitimate government interest).
I 04. Admittedly the court avoided this in part because it simply assumed, without deciding,
that software is speech. See Karn , 925 F. Supp. at 9-10.
105. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). As of the date this article went to press , Bernstein
was pending (after argument) on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. While the ultimate outcome of Bernstein may provide furth er clarity for the law of software described in this article, it does not affect
the more general argument that the lower court's formalistic analysis is deeply flawed.
106. Bernstein, a graduate student at U.C. Berkeley at the time of the 1995 filing (he is now a
professor), wanted to publi sh his own encryption software program, Snuffle, over the Internet and
share the software with colleagues overseas. He filed suit after the State Department deni ed his
request. See id. at 1429-30.
107. See id. at 1434-36, 1439.
108. Jd at 1434-35.
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Amendment values. T he First Amendment is not about the canonizationvi a constitutional status-of what can be printed out on paper, but about preventing the government from proscribing expression- regardless of formbecause of disapproval of the ideas expressed. 109 Focusing on formalistic
categories such as the written and spoken word is not only inconsistent with
the core values of the First Amendment, but m ay al so result in the limiting of
other forms of express ion, especi ally new media technologi es .
Second, the court applied a medium-specific threshold test, but greatly
abstracted the selection of the medium. The court reasoned that because
software is recorded by means of langua ge, it is therefore "written word." 110
And while few would contend that the "written word" is not a t-aditionally
protected medium of expression suffi cient to trigger the Fi rst Amendment, 111
the selection of "written word" rather than "source code" or "software" as
the appropriate analytic medium begs the question . Given a sufficient level
of abstraction, many things might look like the "wri tten word." More to the
point, howe ver, is the converse: Given an increasin g level of abstraction ,
many "traditionally" protected modes of expression begin to lose their clarity. The parades in Hurley begin to look like gatherings, walks, or even simply generalized conduct. Flag burning and dancing would blur into more
generalized conduct, and music would look a lot like noise . 112 This level of
abstraction sidestep around difficult issues works both ways, of course, 113
and the losses might be greater than the gains. 114

109. See. e. g., R.A.V . v. St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992) ("Th e First Amendment generally
prevents government from proscribing speech or even express ive co nduct beca us e of disapproval of
the ideas expressed.") (citations omitted); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating th at
the key principl e underlying the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because soci ety finds the idea offensive).
110. Bernstein, 922 F. S upp . at 1434-35.
Ill. Cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S . 575 ,
583-85 (1983) (noting the hi gh level of First Amendment pro tection given to the press).
112. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S . 781 , 790 ( 1989) (draw ing a di stinction between regulating noi se and regul ating music).
113. To be fair, the relatively thin Supreme Court doctrine regarding th e medium-specific
ana lysis teaches little about the level of abstraction issue. But th e contours of a possible resolution
might be discerned. In Hurley , the Court probably chos e to define the activity as marches or parades rath er th an walking or gatherings because the challenged statutory ac tion was directed at
parades. The parade had regulat01y significance-it was the nexus of the dispute and the locus of
the purported expression. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbia n and Bi sexu al Group, 515 U.S
557, 568-69 (1995). A reaso nabl e standard for the proper level of abstraction may therefore be th e
le ve l which has regul atory significance. In Bernstein, the regulation targeted cryptographic software (or object code and source code). See Bernstein , 922 F. Supp. at 1429; International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XIII(b)(I) ( 1998). That is where the impacted mode of communication lies.
114. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the effec t of basing the threshold test upon the medium of the "written word" is such that the case does not end up lending much support to th e propo-
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Finally, the Bernstein court attempted to support the proposition th at
software is speech by noting that since much computer software is subject to
protection und er the Copyright Act as a " literary work," 115 and copyright law
protects "expression," then software must be expression. 11 6 While thi s
statement has some formalistic appeal (s urel y the term "expression" must be
consi stent across different legal disciplines?) , furth er mvestigation undercuts
its logic. First, the scope of copyright protection is statutory, not constitutional. 117 Second, in many ways, copyright law is a curtailment of free expression, closely skirting the First Amendment. 11 8 Thus, there is no reason to
think that the conceptions of "expression" are similar, much less coextensive.
Third , in order to reconcile the apparent conf1ict, copyright doctrine specifically excludes ideas from protection . 119 The copyrightable remaining work
is known as the expression . 120 In stark contrast, id eas are fundamental to the
First Amendment conception of expression. 121 Therefore, the term " expression " cannot be interchanged between copyright and First Amendment doctrine , and locating the penumbra of First Amendment protections by refer-

s ition that software is speech , since the court 's logical reasoning ex te nds onl y as far as th e uncontroversial argument that the written word triggers the First Amendment.
115. Copyri ght Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)( l) (1994); accord Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. , 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d C ir. 198 3) ("ll1us a computer program,
whether in obj ect code or source code, is a 'literary work ' . ... ").
116. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436.
11 7. See PAUL GOLDST EIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRA DEMARK AND RELATE D STATE
DOCTRINES 552-53 (1997) (discussing the nature and origin of United States copy ri ght law).
118. See gen erally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and th e First Amendment, 70 COL UM. L. REV.
983 (1970) (discuss ing the conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment); Mel ville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970) (discussing policy considerations related to a balance of free speech
and copyright interests). Nonetheless, these commentators note that copyright's incentives for free
expression may enhance the free exchange of ideas. See Goldstein, supra at 990-91 (noting that the
economic incentive of copyright theoretically ensures a wide range of creative subject matter);
Nimmer, supra at 1186 (stating that copyright law is based on the idea that monopoly is a necessary
stimulus to the full realization of creative activities).
119. The idea-expression dichotomy is codified in 17 U.S.C. § l 02(b) ( 1994) ("'n no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship exttnd to any idea . ... "). See Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. , 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977)
(" [T]he idea-expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first amendment.") ; see also Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 11 70).
120. See Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1163 ("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection
granted to a copyrighted work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the
idea itself.").
121. See. e.g., Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15, 26 ( 1971) (stating that expression "conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well") ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 ( 1927) ("[F]reedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the di scovery and spread of .. . truth. ") (Brandeis, J ., concurring).
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ence to those protections of the Copyright Act is profoundl y inappropriate. 122
Whether a particular software product may be protected under the Copyright
Act is simply not rele vant to First Amendment analysis.
The court in Junger v. Daley 123 steered an approximate middle path between the Karn and Bernstein decisions. Holding that "although encryption
source code may occasionally be expressive, its export is not protected conduct und er the First Amendment," 124 the Junger court perfom1ed a two-tier
ontological analys is: first, a medium-based analys is of encryption source
code; and second, a speech-conduct analysis of the exporter 's activities .
While at first glan ce thi s bifurcated ontological analysis may seem promising, a closer look exposes a fa miliar set of weaknesses .
Initi a lly, the court 's medium-based analysis assumed a seemingly limitless number of mediums within the "medium" of software code: "Certain
software is inherently expressive . .. . other software is inherently functional. " 125 Finding source code for encryption software to b e especially
functional rather than expressive, the court noted that "[m]ore than describing encryption, th e software carries out the function of encryption . ... In
doing thi s function , the encryp ti on software is indistinguishable from dedicated computer hardware that does encryption." 126
The parsing of the " medium" of software code does little to improve the
failing of medium-based analyses . 127 First, the opinion continues to condition First Amendment protection on the choice of medium. 128 To the Junger
court, choices within the software genre will determine the outcome rather
than the choice of software as a medium of expression . This is no less troublesome than a broader categorization, of course: Decisions "approving"
certain forms of software code as First Amendment mediums will sti ll underprotect new, unlitigated forms. 129
In distinguishing among apparent sub-mediums in software code , the
Junger court pointed to the functional identity between encrypted source
122. There is another, perhaps as dam ag ing, arg um ent against the use of cop yright a nalogies
in this contex t: It pla ys straight into th e hands of the "func tion al" argument. That is, the so-call ed
"useful arti cles" exc eption to copyright law, codified in 17 U.S .C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. 1996),
limits the scope of copyright protection to pictorial, graphic, and other visua l wo rks by excluding
usefu l aspects of the work. See Brandir Int' l, Inc . v. Cascad e Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142,
1143 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing this limitation).
123. 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
124. /d. at 715.
125. !d. at 7 16.
126. ld
127. See notes 54-76 supra and accompanying text.
128. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 71 6 ("In reviewing gove rnmental regulation of computer
software, the Court need examine the software in volved.").
129. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
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code and dedicated computer hardware. 130 This , of course, is not particularly
helpful; software code, by definition, perfom1s the function of instructing
co mputer hardware to act. The more important (and interesting) part of thi s
anal ys is is that the court based its dec is10n in part on th e results of the so urce
code- that is, the acts that the softwa re seeks to have the hardware perform.
The co urt seemed to say that bec au se encryption code is not protec ted by the
F irst Amendment, the so ftw are that "carries out the function of encryp tion"
does not receive uniform protecti on 131 Significantly, the focus on results
implicitly removes the "medium" question to a fom1 of conduct an alysis.
That is, the issue becomes whether the results of the software code are expressive or simply functional.
However, comparing expression ve rsus fu nctionality for software is no
less difficult than measuring speech versus conduct for human behavior. 132
A software-hardware combination that performs encryption is quite likely to
be both expression and function-bo th the act of encrypting and a state ment
about encryption policy. Again, the undifferentiated whole. 133
After determining that encryption so urce code is rarely expressive, the
Junger court moved to a more traditional speech-conduct analysis of the act
of exporting encryption source code . Applying Spence, the court determined
that the export of source code does not convey an unmistakable m essage,
ostensibly because the code itself is not sufficiently expressive. 134 This, of
course, is ontology upon ontology. In essence, the Junger opinion concludes
that because the purported speaker chose an unexpressive medium of communication, transmitting the purported expression cannot be speech. The
choice of medium is again dispositive; the speech-conduct outcome is predetermined.
In the end, Junger upheld the export regulations for reasons as questionable as the Bernstein court's opposite conclusion. 135 Although the court recognized the fallacy of Bernstein's "speech is writing" analysis, 136 and focused instead on the functionality of the medium of source code, this func··
tionality determination-as merely a different fom1 of medium-based analysis-is little better than the misguided formalism used by the Bernstein court.

130. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
131. !d.
132. See notes 41-53 supra and accompanying text.
133 . See El y, supra no te 2, at 1495.
134. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 7 17-1 8 ("Because the exp ressive elements of encryption
so urce code are neither 'unmistakable' nor ' overwhel mingl y apparent ' its export is not protected
conduct under the First Amendment.") (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 , 505-06 ( 1969) and Texas v. Johnson, 49 1 U.S. 397 , 406 ( 1989)).
135 . See notes I 05-122 supra and acco mpanying tex t.
136. See note I 08 supra and accompanying te xt.
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Neither the Kanz nor the B ernstein case directly addressed the applic ation of computer software to the oth er ontological mode of thre shold anal ysis: the speech-conduct distinction . 137 As noted above , the spe ech-conduct
distinction rests upon the fallacy that the ex pressive elements in any action
can be separated from the conduct. 138 As Jun ger amply demonstrates, there
is no reason to belie ve that software \viii have any special immunity from
thi s problem. Indeed , if there ever was conduct that was an "undifferentiated
whole" of action and expression , the use and operation of computer code
would seem to be it. 139 The hypothetical programmer Debra is both acting
and expre ssing when she releases Lucifer onto the Internet; trying to separate
the two el ements of her activity wo uld be no easier than it would for the
burning of draft cards. 140
The analysis of software under the speech-conduct distinction is problemati c because computer code is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, func tional. Thi s inherent, and possibly overwhelming, fun ctional aspect serves to
undennine a speaker's claim that the development or use of computer software is intended to convey a particularized message . If Johnson had been
burning hi s fla g for wannth, or O'Brien using his draft card to start hi s barbecue, the Court would have been hard-pressed to find sufficient elements of
expression to warrant First Amendment protection. The Bernstein court
dismissed this argument as "immaterial," comparing computer software to
recipes, instructions, and do-it-yourself manuals, which it noted are also
speech . 141 But the analogies don ' t fit. Each of these examples is itself used
to communicate infonnation between people; so ftw are, to the extent it can be
considered a set of instructions, communicates only to machines. While it is
true that there is no exception to the First Amendment for useful speech, w
this argument presupposes the existence of speech. After all, the First
Amendment does not protect products. 143
137. The go ve rnment's primary contention in Bem slein appears to have bee n that softwa re itse lf was conduct rather than speech, and could thu s be regulated . See Bernstein v. United States
Dep ' t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1996). As I demonstrate bel ow, this was not th e
most helpful appro ach.
13 8. See notes 42-50 supra and ac companying text.
139 . Thi s statement sets as ide the obvious d istincti on betwee n th e actual software code
(source or obj ect) and the comm enls , if any, inse rt ed into th e sou rce code to make it more readab le
for humans. Comments, which add nothing to the operation or function of th e software , would be
f•1 ll y protec ted by the First Amendment irrespective of the sta tus of the software itself.
140. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 , 376 (1968) (refu sing to decid e defi niti ve ly if
0 ' Brien ' s actions co uld constitute speec h).
141 . See Bernslein , 922 F. S upp . at 1435.
142. Se e id.
143. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam 's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 , 1036 (9th Cir. 199 1) (co ntras tin g, for
First Amendment purposes, " products ," such as aeronautical charts , with "ideas and express ion in a
book").
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III. TH E BEST LA W O F S OFTWARE IS N O L AW OF SO FTWA RE

As thi s note has demonstrated, the "law of software'' is still un settled .
The three case s that have addressed the issue are split in their ultimate holdings as far as the First Amendment status of source code. These decisions
are undercut by a seri es of fallacies and misunderstandings. The vvildly divergent holdings and troublesom e analyses of Bernstein and Junger demonstrate that the already weakened ontological approach to First A mendment
analysi s cannot support the weight of new mediums of communication , and
that software is not- and should not be- "a law unto itself."l.J.J
The teleological mode of analysis is a more analytically sound method
for evaluating the scope of First Amendment protection for software. Thi s
method , of course, tell s us nothing about the protection given to the medium
of computer softw are , except that software will receive neither fa vorable nor
unfavorable treatment. Furthermore, a teleological method of analysis will
neither hinder nor help software 's status as a developing technology . By not
according special constitutional status to different forms or types of software,
the law avoids distorting the market for software and related technologies.
However attractive it might be in the abstract to develop a " law of software"- to perhaps once and for all put software beyond the scope of government regulators- --<:areful analysis reveals that the best law of software is
no law of software. Technology inexorably develops ; we simply cannot
know how it will change our world or why. But we can be sure that software
is far from the last new mode of communications to come down the pike.
Therefore, as the Court clearly stated in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC: 14 5
"[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies ... allows us to declare a
rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes . ... Rather, aware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the
technology, and the industrial structure, related to [this industry], we believe it
unwise and unneces sary definitely to pick one analogy or one specific set of
words now ." 146

In the context of computer software, focusing on the medium would be the
mistake.

144. Metromedia, Inc . v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,501 (1981).
145. ll6S.Ct . 2374 ( 1996).
146. !d. at 2385 (citations omitted).

